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Abstract
Sustainability in the public finances. This was the mantra of the IMF-ECB-EC Troika bailout.
How was sustainability achieved? Mainly by changing aspects of the budgetary process. Ireland
was required to submit the entirety of its budgetary framework for external scrutiny by the Troika
and Eurozone member state governments. We briefly explore how the economic constitution of the
European Union in the context of the Irish bailout turned macroeconomic sustainability into an in-
strument to redirect the majority of Irish policy decision-making out of the hands of democratically
accountable parliamentarians and into the arms of unaccountable technocrats.
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1. The Impact of the Bailout and New Rules
Sustainability in the Irish public finances was the primary interest of the Troika and the Irish
government since the December 2010 bailout plan. It was to be secured by a series of actions that
changed the structure of the Irish taxation system but the majority of the correction of the fiscal
position was achieved by the nominal fall in public sector wages, decreases in the numbers employed
by the public sector and a series of cuts to social welfare and the public capital programme. The
advantage of this programme of reform was that it was primarily developed by the Irish authorities
in December 2010 and was modified, to a minor extent, by the Fine Gael-Labour coalition in
March of 2011. This programme was then followed until the exit of Ireland from the official sector
programme in December 2013. The question now is the development of a sustained fiscal future for
Ireland. The key challenge is how to secure that fiscal stability but still ensure that there remains
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a democratic structure of accountability. In this paper we look, from a parliamentary perspective,
at the Irish experience of the Bailout, the imposition of EU fiscal rules and how the budget process
in Ireland has changed as a result of these external and internal pressures.
The reality of the situation is that the Irish fiscal position was determined largely by the Novem-
ber 2010 National Recovery Plan 2011-2015. The Plan predated the involvement of the IMF but
was in keeping with many of the recommendations of the Troika. The Letter of Intent of 3 Decem-
ber 2010 stated:
‘To continue with the programme of fiscal consolidation, a comprehensive National Recovery
Plan 2011-14 was approved by the Government and published on 24 November 2010. This Plan
forms the basis for the 2011 budget consistent with fiscal consolidation measures amounting to e15
billion, a 9 percent of GDP budgetary correction over the period 2011-14. Having stabilised the
deficit, albeit at a high level, the steps announced in the Plan will place the budget deficit-to-GDP
ratio on a firm downward path. While the debt-to-GDP ratio will remain at high levels for the next
few years, it is projected to decline thereafter, underpinning debt sustainability. We also propose to
keep under review progress towards meeting the Stability and Growth Pact targets.’ (IMF1, 2010: 7)
The Irish approach to fiscal consolidation and sustainability was clouded by the need to make a
series of rapid adjustments to the public expenditure space. This was achieved in the 2011 budget
by way of a front-loaded e6 billion in consolidation. Part of the desire was to communicate to the
international capital markets the seriousness with which the Irish authorities took this policy.
The view of the IMF official in charge of the programme, Mr.Ajai Chopra, was that Ireland was
being overly ambitious at the time of the Bailout with respect to its fiscal targets but understood
that this was part of a longer and more complex structure of negotiations related the structure
of the Promissory Notes, which supported the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, and the status
of the remaining senior bondholders of the Irish banking system. Chopra made it clear that the
sustainability of the public finances was under way as part of the Irish domestic consolidation
programme. This progress was in many ways welcomed by the Troika during the December 2010
to December 2013 programme but the Fund did recommend tempering some of the measures to
1IMF. Ireland: Letter of Intent 3 December 2010. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2010.
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improve the domestic demand and employment situation. Half way into the program, the IMF’s
2012 Article IV discussions provided an opportunity to step back and review the approach to fiscal
consolidation to ensure that remaining consolidation needs would be met in a manner that was both
durable and protected the vulnerable. Ireland did not take this advice at the time and continued a
relatively rapid consolidation, largely to achieve EU rules.
The new budgetary process that Ireland had to comply with as a result of these legislative
changes is outlined in Figure 1 which illustrates the nature of the Irish government’s budgetary
process. The most significant developments in the domestic sphere of the budgetary process post
Bailout by engaging in extensive EU and domestic oversight in the pre-budget phase. The idea was
to place the Irish public finances on a sustainable and EU policy compliant pathway. This is the
aim of the expanded fiscal remit of the European Commission, as it rationalized that this will bring
greater stability to the currency union (Bénassy-quéré and Ragot [2016]; Niemann and Ioannou
[2015]; and Schmidt [2016]). Figure 2 illustrates how this is supposed work for the purposes of
policy coordination.
Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here
The semester adds a new dimension of oversight from the European Commission. The key
component is the ‘country specific recommendations’ or CSRs provided by the Commission for the
purposes of developing a sustainable approach to the public finances. Most of the recommendations
relate to two areas. First, those that will direct the country in question towards a position of
structural budget balance. The other is towards supply-side measures that will improve the overall
competitiveness of the economy under review.
Insert Figures 3 through 7 about here
The modifications to the budget process have made for a much more complex approach to
budgeting, based on a combination of hard and soft fiscal rules incorporated into constitutional law
or into normal statutes. These rules, except for the statements made by the Fiscal Advisory Council,
inhabit the environment of hard law. That is, they are clearly incorporated into the legal structures
of Ireland and must be acknowledged and adhered to within the parameters of legislative direction.
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The Fiscal Advisory Council, created as part of the conditionality of the Troika Bailout, has a
statutory basis for existence but its actions, recommendations and reports. The Advisory Council’s
authority comes more from moral suasion than legal obligation and the present government has
adopted an a´-la-cart approach to applying recommendations. Figures three through seven illustrate
the structure and design of these new fiscal rules and how they interact with the traditional budget
process.
2. The Role of Parliament
The Irish parliament, like most traditional Westminster-models, reserve the power over tax and
expenditure to the lower house of parliament within a bicameral system. In the case of Ireland this
is referred to as Da´il Eireann. The upper house, Seanad Eireann, has very limited capacity to make
recommendations to the budget items. The Da´il, made up of 166 members, has an executive, from
which the Minister for Finance is drawn. Since the 2011 election, matters related to the budget
have been distributed between the Minister for Finance, responsible for taxation, macroeconomic
management, banking and financial regulation and ECOFIN meetings, and the Minister for Public
Expenditure and Reform, responsible for the allocation of expenditure to different parts of the public
sector. The Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform is responsible
for reviewing the budget, and most closely the Finance Bill, and engaging in a process of filtering
requests from interest groups and civil society into the budgetary process. The Public Accounts
Committee engages in ex post evaluation of expenditure. This budget structure is reactive, most
responding to policy initiatives begun by the Minister for Finance. The new budgetary frameworks
provided by the European Union fiscal rules along with the structure of the IMF bailout package
severely limited the input of the parliament in the budget process. This poses some series issues
for the future role of democratic accountability.
Since the start of the process of fiscal consolidation that began shortly after the September 2008
Banking Guarantee, the Irish government began a process of consolidating the public finances. Such
emergency measures were largely crafted within the Department of Finance and then presented by
then Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan to the parliament for approval. Given the Westminster
model, the political structure of Ireland ensured that these measures were accepted. The political
response to the Troika Bailout in December 2010 was to move towards a general election, which
took place in February 2011 and the new government largely accepted the reform programme
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presented by the Irish civil service and the Troika. Since exiting the bailout in December 2013,
much has been made of Ireland’s renewed economic sovereignty. Ultimately the changes made
by EU fiscal rules limit the effectiveness parliamentary oversight and the influence of civil society
on adding to budgetary measures. Even in the waning days of the previous Fianna Fail-Green
coalition government, some semblance of party discipline remained and the imposition of the party
whip remains a strong tradition in the Irish parliament. As a result the ability to vote against the
party which one is a member is extremely limited, as there is no constitutional right to a so-called
‘free-vote’ in the Irish parliament, as there would exist in the German Republic or many recently
transitioned Central and East European Counties. Under these conditions the role of parliament
as a source of oversight and with a view towards sustainability and critique of mainstream policy
decisions is extremely limited.
Insert Figure 8 about here
This does not mean that the political system at the parliamentary level does not attempt
to posture greater influence than it may have at any one given point in time. There exists an
uneasy tension between the professional civil service and the members of the political class in all
parliamentary environments. In the Irish context this is exacerbated by the political outcome of
the 2010 Bailout. As presented in Figure 8, the Fianna Fail-Green Party coalition lost on an almost
revolutionary scale with the Green Party losing all its parliamentarians and Fianna Fail losing
77 seats. The political class, both winners and losers from 2011, see the lack of accountability
suffered by the civil and public service as an ongoing sore point and the operation of the Public
Accounts Committee (PAC), with ex post budgetary oversight has been part of the response. This
has incurred legal responses from various individuals who have been placed before the PAC. These
legal responses, in conjunction with several banking crisis civil and criminal actions (Corbet [2016])
remain sub judice limited the capacity of the Banking Inquiry to question public and private sector
actors.
3. Where Next for Parliaments?
The Irish case study is a clear example of how quickly the nexus of politics and professional
economic policymaking can work to exclude the legislature. The legislature becomes a token ele-
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ment of legitimization for decisions made by others. In the context of the Irish parliament this was
done partly by executive structures that existed as part of the Taoiseach’s office, cabinet collective
decisions, the role of the senior civil service, the role of supranational bodies and officials and se-
nior political figures from friendly countries. In all these contexts the general ‘rules of the game’
as outlined by law and legal precedent work to general limit the extent to which parliaments can
interfere with policy that is either the product of technocratic analysis or the European economic
constitution.
In this context the parliamentarian is effectively defunct. The role of the parliamentarian is
to act as an information conduit into the policymaking process but not to partake in it. As it
stands the effectiveness of that role as communicator can only exist to a greater of lesser extent
as a function of access to senior cabinet figures. While it may seem keenly fatalist to come to
this conclusion it is important to note that it is drawn from a series of responses on the part of
the electorate, the law courts and supranational institutions to the real and perceived failures and
weaknesses that exist with the capacity for parliament and parliamentarians to achieve sustainable,
corruption-free, legally-justifiable, equitable decisions on matters relating to the public purse.
The current economic constitution of Europe does not afford the parliamentarian or the senior
minister or domestic official much run for free budgetary decisions. This is seen as a necessary
condition to the maintained of the monetary union. But one problem remains - who should decide
how we order the economic and fiscal components of our society? Is it the people? It is their
representatives? Is it the technocrats? Is it a wider ‘system’ outside and above the nation-state?
At no point during the Global Financial Crisis or during the post-1989 period were these ques-
tions adequately posed or answered. The situation most Western governments find themselves in
now, especially Ireland, is one brought about by ad hoc responses to events and inertia - legal,
administrative, political and economic.
The current role of the parliamentarian needs to be redefined, much like it was in the mid-
nineteenth century following the Great Reform Act in the UK. Sustainability will have to be part
of that process of redefinition but also scrutiny.
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4. Conclusion
This paper has outlined some of the radical changes that have taken place in the fiscal space
in Ireland as a Troika Bailout country since 2010. The changes are profound at the institutional
level but also have had deep political effects, changing the nature and role of parliament in the
process. This is a perspective draw from a practitioner in parliamentary policy circles in Ireland. It
mostly asks questions related to the unspoken changes that have taken place over the past decade
since the start of the Global Financial Crisis. We have outlined the changes made in practice and
law to the process of budget formation and decision making. We have framed the new role of the
parliamentarian in this process and presented where the challenges lie ahead for any new parliament
coming to power in Ireland and in other countries. Ultimately the challenges that exist for the role
of parliament in sustainable budget policymaking need to be addressed if there is to be a continued
role for the people in deciding the character of the societies and economies in which they reside.
The public finances are too important to leave solely in the hands of technocrats, the executive or
the legislature alone.
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Figure 1: The Role of Parliament in the Budget Process
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Figure 2: The EU Fiscal Governance Structure
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